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Abstract 
The WTO has struggled with the treatment of nonmarket economies (NMEs). What was a nonissue in 
the original GATT (because of the homogeneity of participants) became quite an issue with the 
accession of formally centrally planned economies, which were not transformed to market economies, 
at least not in the eyes of the incumbents. Contracting this issue has proved to be so far always 
wanting, and leaving it to adjudicators has not produced good results either. With respect to Chinese 
SOEs this risks continuing to be an issue, since the contractually agreed deadline (2016) after which 
China should not be treated as NME anymore, risks proving to be full of holes and loopholes. 
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1. Property Regime and the WTO 
Issues surrounding the operation of state owned enterprises in the international trading system is an 
understudied area and yet one of increasing importance, particularly given the size and significance of 
Chinese state owned enterprises (SOE). We start by situating the SOE within the GATT and WTO 
frameworks and then summarize the main findings of a set papers prepared for an advanced law and 
policy seminar on SOEs held at Columbia Law School in the fall 2016. 
By way of introduction, it is important to remember that the GATT (General Agreements on Tariffs 
and Trade), the predecessor of the WTO (World Trade Organization), did not contain any provisions 
to differentiate between approaches to property rights at the domestic level. The assumption was that 
members of the GATT would be free markets (as opposed to centrally planned economies, or non 
market economies – NMEs for short). 
The GATT did not, however, close its doors to centrally planned economies. Indeed, Poland and 
Romania joined the GATT and did not change the fundamental character of their centrally planned 
systems. With the triumph of liberal ideas in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, a number of former NMEs 
adopted free market policies and joined the WTO, which came into being on January 1, 1995. 
Causality is hard to determine, however, i.e., whether countries first abandoned their NME status and 
joined the WTO or whether joining the WTO contributed to their evolution away from planning.  
Indeed, quite a variety of economic systems came to join the WTO, which did not oblige uniform 
national approaches to trade or investment. Indeed, this lack of a harmonization requirement has often 
been seen as a central strength of the GATT and WTO architecture. The WTO, contrary to the GATT, 
adopted the practice of negotiating elaborate protocols of accession for NMEs, aimed at addressing 
issues specific to the NME that was joining the WTO, until (the hope was) they would evolve into 
market economies. This is by way of brief background for the following discussion of the 
GATT/WTO architecture around SOEs. 
2. GATT: Solving the Problem by Participation 
The GATT was negotiated at a point in time when the only major NME of significance was the USSR 
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). Because the USSR declined the invitation to join the GATT, the 
architecture of the GATT did not have to think long and hard about addressing NME-related issues. 
2.1 Canada Suggests Only Like-Minded Should be Invited 
A brief review of history reminds us that following a Canadian proposal to this effect,
1
 the instigators 
of the GATT issued an invitation to participate in the upcoming negotiations only to like-minded 
countries — and this essentially meant market economies. This approach was thought by some to be 
too narrow an approach and going against the Hullian idea of pursuing liberalization of trade as an 
instrument to foster peace and security.
2
 The eventual compromise, as reported at length in Irwin et al. 
(2008), was to keep the door open. Accordingly, an invitation to join the GATT was consequently 
issued to the USSR.  
                                                     
1
 See the relevant discussion in Irwin et al. (2008). 
2
 Cordell Hull, the US Foreign Secretary during the Roosevelt Administration, and Nobel Prize laureate for his 
contribution to post WWII peace, was adamant that trade liberalization was the safest way in establishing communication 
across nations, and thus contribute meaningfully to peace. Irwin et al. (2008) provide a lot of evidence to this effect.  
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2.1.1 Back to the USSR 
By 1946, when the GATT was under negotiation, the USSR had already rejected the market opening 
ideas of Lenin and its New Economic Policy (NEP). It had become a closed system that would engage 
in international trade only with members of its alliance. Churchill described this situation in his 
famous speech of March 5, 1946: 
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the 
continent. 
Unsurprisingly thus, upon receipt of the invitation to join the GATT, the USSR declined it. The road 
was thus open to negotiate the GATT across like-minded players, albeit with one, last minute point of 
friction. 
2.1.2 Czechoslovakia Switches Camps, Then Leaves 
Czechoslovakia was a free market when the GATT negotiations were initiated. Following the Yalta 
Agreement and the ensuing establishment of the ‘Iron Curtain’, the dividing line between market 
economies and NMEs in Europe, it switched camps. Czechoslovakia did not immediately withdraw 
from the negotiations. It eventually decided not to sign the GATT, which it then joined only decades 
later in 1993 after its transition to market economy (in fact, its two components joined the WTO 
namely, the Czech- and the Slovak Republic through separate acts of accession). 
2.2 Statutory Provisions Regarding NMEs 
The United Kingdom (UK) was a key participant in the early negotiations. Although the leading 
economist of his generation, John Maynard Keynes, did not participate in the GATT negotiation 
because of his untimely death, he had ample time during the Bretton Woods negotiations to express 
his views on the role of government when conducting international trade. According to Irwin et al. 
(2008) on p. 18: 
Keynes strongly believed that government economic planning would be required to ensure full 
employment in the postwar period. Such planning, in his view, would necessarily include 
government controls on international trade.
3
 The State Department and other U.S. agencies took a 
very different view. Not only did they want nondiscrimination as a key part of the world trading 
system, but they also wanted to ensure that most international trade would be left in the hands of 
private enterprise, not government planners. 
Chief among the provisions regarding the role of the state in trade relations, was Article XVII of 
GATT regarding the function of state-trading enterprises (STEs). Its key features provide:  
… a State enterprise … shall, in its purchases or sales involving either imports or exports, act in a 
manner consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment …require that such 
enterprises … make any such purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial 
considerations,* … and shall afford the enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate 
opportunity, in accordance with customary business practice, to compete for participation in such 
purchases or sales (emphasis added) 
                                                     
3
 An economic official at the U.S. Embassy in London, E. F. Penrose (1953, 18), recalled about this period: “At that time 
and later I did my best to impress on Mr. Keynes and other government economists that the desire for freer and for non-
discriminatory trade in the State Department should not be written off as the product of a nineteenth century laissez-faire 
attitude toward economic affairs, untouched by recent economic thought and experience. . . . In conversations in 
Washington both Acheson and Hawkins showed themselves progressive in outlook and under no illusion that freer trade 
alone was panacea for all economic ills. However, it soon appeared that the contrary view had been expressed to British 
officials in Washington by some U.S. officials outside the State Department.” Markwell (2006) provides a good study of 
Keynes’s views on international economic matters. 
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Eventually, another provision was added in the form of an Interpretative Note to Article VI of 
GATT. 
2.2.1 Article XVII of GATT 
The UK and Canada were the leaders of the discussion of this provision, which aimed to discipline 
trading nations that conducted trade through state entities. Wheat Boards, for example, were very 
much in vogue around that time aiming to stabilize fluctuating prices of farm goods. The provision 
imposed a nondiscrimination obligation on STEs, and, in the second paragraph, an obligation for them 
to act in accordance with commercial considerations, and to afford adequate opportunities to 
competitors. 
Case law has substantially weakened the ‘bite’ of this provision, by finding that it suffices for STEs 
to act in a nondiscriminatory manner. In this view, by acting in this manner, STEs had ipso facto acted 
in accordance with commercial considerations, and had afforded competitors adequate opportunities to 
compete as well. This view is, of course, at best doubtful, but by now it is water under the bridge, 
since there is not one single deviation from this case law.
4
 
2.2.2 Article VI of GATT  
The Interpretative Note to Article VI of GATT
5
 provides for the possibility to deviate from standard 
antidumping procedures when dealing with exporters originating in NMEs. The interesting feature of 
this provision is that it provides for a definition of NMEs: 
It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or substantially 
complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State … 
This is a very demanding provision. By this standard, one might in principle wonder if there is even 
one nation on earth at the present time that qualifies as an NME. And yet, in application, the practice 
has proven flexible. This provision has been used against Eastern European countries, as well as China 
and some of its neighbors.  
2.2.3 End Result: Much Ado about Nothing (but Something is Around the Corner)  
Given this history, it follows that the GATT regime did not address the issue of state trading or the 
operation of firms in non-market economies in a comprehensive manner. It was not much of an issue, 
in any event, in the early days given the small membership of the GATT. Over time, however, as 
many more countries joined into the system, the systemic consequences of limited provisions on 
NMEs have become more significant and apparent.  
2.3 Subsequent Accessions 
Prior to the negotiation of the Uruguay Round, only two NMEs joined the GATT, namely, Poland 
(1967) and Romania (1971). They signed protocols of accession where they accepted a few additional 
obligations, but nothing very comprehensive or dramatic. They continued as NMEs until the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, and the beginning of their negotiation to accede to the European Union (Williams 2008). 
                                                     
4
 Mavroidis (2016) discusses the case law to this effect. The leading case is Canada-Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, 
issued in 2004, where the Appellate Body understood the obligation to not discriminate as the overarching obligation, and 
the obligations to “act in accordance with commercial consideration”, and to “afford adequate opportunities to compete” 
as mere expressions of the obligations to not discriminate, and not as distinct legal obligations.  
5
 Jackson (1969) discusses this provision, its birth and original idea in detail.  
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For much of its early history the GATT was overwhelmingly comprised of western nations and there 
was no perceived need to develop comprehensive provisions to address what seemed to be a nonissue. 
3. Solving the Problem by Contracting 
This changed with the WTO. One hundred and twenty three nations signed onto the WTO initially, 
and many of them were not full market economies. Given the limited coverage of relevant provisions 
under the rules of the GATT, trading nations chose to add additional disciplines through the 
contracting process of the negotiation of protocols of accession. Disciplines were agreed both at the 
multilateral as well as the preferential level. 
3.1 Multilateral Solutions (WTO) 
The WTO, as per its custom to minimize negotiating costs, did not address the issue of SOEs in a 
horizontal manner. It did not amend existing provisions. It preferred to address selected issues on an 
ad hoc basis by allowing incumbents to negotiate deals with acceding nations. The means to do this 
were offered by the new, lengthy Protocols of Accession. 
NME-status, if we take the statutory definition seriously, does not only arise in the case of the 
China. Many WTO members meet the definitional standard. Nevertheless, only the Chinese Protocol 
of Accession includes elaborate provisions on NMEs. Indeed, the Russian Protocol of Accession pales 
in comparison, as do the protocols of some Gulf countries with elaborate sovereign wealth funds and 
other state run entities.  
Why is China the issue? As evident in discussion after discussion in our seminar, the answer can be 
found in two words: “size matters”. China accepted to be treated until 2016 an NME, and avoided thus 
the negotiation of disciplines that would oblige it to precommit to a particular market structure by a 
date certain. Title 15 of its Protocol of Accession (Price Comparability in Determining Subsidies and 
Dumping) reads: 
Once China has established, under the national law of the importing WTO Member, that it is a 
market economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that the 
importing Member's national law contains market economy criteria as of the date of accession. In 
any event, the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession. 
In addition, should China establish, pursuant to the national law of the importing WTO Member, 
that market economy conditions prevail in a particular industry or sector, the non-market economy 
provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to that industry or sector. 
It is not entirely clear why 2016 was selected as the date when China would no longer be treated as an 
NME. Some of the papers presented in our seminar (Levy) have advanced the argument that, 
presumably, WTO members might have thought that between 2001, the year of Chinese accession to 
the WTO, and 2016, the reforms that were then underway would have translated into a fully 
functioning market economy, whatever ultimate beneficial ownership may still exist.  
More generally, as some of the essays herein amplify, China agreed in its Protocol to far reaching 
provisions around its domestic trade and economic system. For example, in article 9 of its Protocol it 
committed to “allow prices for traded goods and services in every sector to be determined by market 
forces”; in Article 5.1 it committed to “progressively liberalize the availability and scope of the right 
to trade, so that within three years after accession all enterprises in China shall have the right to trade 
in goods”; it further committed in article 6.1 that “import purchasing procedures of state trading 
enterprises are fully transparent”. As evidenced by these and other provisions, China’s Protocol was 
perhaps the most ambitious and far reaching set of commitments of any developing country that has 
joined the international trading system.  
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3.2 Preferential Trade Agreements 
There is not much practice regarding the treatment of NMEs in the context of preferential trade 
agreements. A recent and fairly comprehensive approach is offered by the definition of SOEs in TPP 
(Trans-Pacific Partnership). TPP was negotiated by the countries around the Pacific Rim, but China 
was not part of the negotiation and, as a result, it could not influence its structure and outcome. Bhala 
(2017) discusses in detail the TPP definition of NMEs in this volume. As he explains, the TPP 
definition of NMEs clearly departs from the WTO case law understanding regarding the nature of 
obligations imposed on the state sector.  
3.3 The Road Ahead 
We are now in early 2017, and China has already initiated litigation to have WTO judges decide 
whether the 2016 deadline has to be honored. Is 2016 the end of the road for China as an NME?  
It is always difficult to predict how the Appellate Body might decide on a question before it but in 
EC-Fasteners the Appellate Body appears to have opened the door to treat China as an NME even 
after 2016. Bown and Mavroidis (2013) suggested that the onus will be on complainants who will 
have to demonstrate that states influence prices. Their argument, briefly, is that by including 2016 as 
some sort of ‘expiration date’ for treating China as an NME, WTO members did not give up on their 
right to do so after 2016 as well. This date should be understood differently. WTO members can treat 
China as an NME until 2016 without adducing any evidence to this effect, that is, by merely invoking 
the statutory provision in the Protocol of Accession. After 2016, they can continue to do the same, but 
in this case, they will have to honor the associated burden of proof, that is, they will have to show that 
the Chinese state has influenced prices, and the latter are not the reflection of a market clearing 
mechanism. 
This is not a far-fetched theory as it simply cannot be that the NME provision applies in principle 
to everyone but not to China. In theory any jurisdiction could be treated in this way, such as the US 
following the introduction of TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program), or the EU when heavily 
subsidizing some of its sectors. If so, why not China? 
By this reading, 2016 would mean that China will not automatically be treated as an NME. Those 
who want to apply the rules around NMEs would have to make the case for it. But this particular set of 
issues has to do with the standards that will apply with respect to contingent protection, which is 
reviewed on a case by case basis. WTO’s main contribution is to address conditions that affect 
international trade more broadly; it is not designed to address rivalry within markets. Other 
instruments (such as antitrust or competition laws) are meant to address similar concerns within 
markets.  
How are SOEs affecting access to foreign imports? Is this covered by the rules of the WTO? Has 
China established a fully transparent trade regime? Needless to say, these are some of the complex and 
new questions being raised by Chinese commercial entities.  
4. Contributions on China and SOEs prepared for the law and policy seminar 
Papers addressed three broad themes: first, the substantive economic and trade regime; second, the 
intersection between trade and competition policy, and third, transparency of and dispute adjudication 
relating to SOEs.  
4.1 The Substantive Trade Regime 
Lin (2017) explains the manner in which SOEs operate and their oversight by different state entities, 
providing an excellent background for understanding the main challenges to the world trading system 
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presented by SOEs. Lin provides a comprehensive anatomy of Chinese SOEs by unpacking their 
various relations with different instruments of the state. She shows that Chinese SOEs are embedded 
in a network composed of dense and complex links with the state. Shareholding ties, albeit important, 
are only one feature of potential state influence or control. She illustrates important governance 
institutions that are unobservable (e.g., they have no statutory underpinnings), and are quite distinct 
from approaches elsewhere in the world. In doing that, she explains the role of state intervention in 
administering SOEs, particularly through the SASAC (State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administrative Commission of the State Council), a state entity responsible for administration of 
SOEs.  
Mastromatteo (2017) discusses Article XVII of GATT. He notes that, by acting as a trader, a 
government may influence the direction of international trade through its purchases and sales 
decisions without resort to other more direct means of trade regulation. The GATT recognizes that 
governments may choose to participate in international commerce in competition with private firms, 
but it does not leave them with a free hand when it comes to carrying out trading operations. In the 70 
years since their adoption, developments in both the GATT 1947 and the WTO have delineated a set 
of relatively limited disciplines rooted in the principle of nondiscrimination, raising doubts about their 
effectiveness to address the kinds of problems caused by state trading today. It remains true, however, 
that while STEs continue to operate across the world, and fundamental questions about the full reach 
and scope of the existing disciplines endure, opportunities to clarify their role in the modern trading 
system may well arise in the future practice of WTO members. 
Prusa (2017) focuses on the other core GATT provision, the Interpretative Note as Article VI, and 
the manner in which NMEs have fared in WTO antidumping practice. In his paper, he aims to show 
that, whereas the statutes allow investigating authorities more leeway when dealing with NMEs, 
abuses have been condemned in case law. To do this, he focuses in a very important litigation that 
occurred in 2007, when the US reversed its long-standing policy prohibiting the simultaneous 
imposition of anti-dumping duties (ADDs) and countervailing duties (CVDs) against nonmarket 
economies. The EU followed the US’ lead and also began imposing simultaneous ADDs and CVDs. 
The practice, however, leads to double remedies. The WTO Appellate Body recently ruled that double 
remedies were inconsistent with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) and 
that the burden was on the investigating authorities to ensure that double remedies were not being 
imposed.  
In a companion paper, Lee (2017) focuses on the issue whether Chinese SOEs should be 
considered to be a ‘public body’ in the sense of the SCM Agreement. A positive response would entail 
that the SCM disciplines apply to SOEs. This is an issue that has occupied the minds of WTO judges 
for some time now, and case law is not characterized by internal coherence either. Lee explains the 
various transformations of case law in this respect, as well as its current status. In his view, a 
sophisticated ‘control’-criterion seems appropriate, and he advances a few thoughts regarding the 
manner in which it should be practiced. 
Levy (2017) discusses the manner in which SOEs have been handled in Protocols of Accession. 
His main conclusion is that they have not been handled particularly well. He notes that the treatment in 
the text of the Chinese Protocol was very brief, and essentially offered particular China-specific 
adjustments to existing WTO agreements, such as the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM). Those agreements had often been inadequate to handle the issues faced by a pre-
China WTO and the tweaks were insufficient to handle the additional problems posed by China. In 
many cases, foreseeable problems were simply not addressed at all in the Protocol. Unsurprisingly, 
thus, we end up in the current state, where no jurisdiction seems to be happy with the regulation of 
SOEs.  
Bhala (2017) focuses on how regional initiatives, and specifically the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), have tried to avoid the shortcomings of the multilateral (inadequate) regulation of SOEs. Free 
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trade agreements (FTAs) are about far more than free trade, he notes. They are often about national 
security as well. Against this background, he makes two points. First, TPP exemplifies the possibility 
of enhancing US national security objectives. Advancement of such objectives may occur through the 
containment of China and its ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Second, the debate over the 
definition of SOE is one among many illustrations in TPP of the link between national security, trade, 
and containment. The 12 nations negotiating TPP were aware of this link, and deliberated on the 
definition of SOE. TPP parties did not include China amongst its founding members, even as the 
founding members wrote TPP rules that would bind China if it subsequently joined the deal. Chinese 
SOEs were of concern to the negotiating parties to the TPP for both economic and national security 
reasons. In addition, a number of TPP parties had their own sovereign interests in providing goods and 
services through their own SOEs. The evaluation by America and its 11 TPP partners as to which 
entities should be included in the scope of SOE disciplines, produced, for the first time, a set of clear 
rules. 
4.2 Trade and Competition Issues  
A second cluster of papers considered the competition issues associated with SOEs. Wu (2017) 
discusses why, despite the fact that China’s WTO Protocol of Accession imposes several restrictions 
on China’s use of export policies to support domestic industries, China’s trading partners nevertheless 
regularly bemoan Chinese practices. In his contribution, Wu examines a series of Chinese export 
policies that have been the subject of WTO complaints. He discusses several elements of WTO law 
that render the WTO largely ineffective in confronting these practices. He argues that, because of 
domestic constraints and negotiating stasis, it is unlikely that the WTO system will undertake any 
major reforms to address these shortcomings. He concludes that as a consequence, tensions are likely 
to continue rising between China and its trading partners. 
Kovacic (2017) focuses on the extent of rivalry within the Chinese market, and the significant and 
broad policy developments emerging from the 3
rd 
Plenum, namely the decisions to establish a 
competitive economy, and at the 4
th
 Plenum to advance the rule of law. These reforms are necessary to 
achieving China’s strategic economic objectives, and to its successful and rapid transition to become a 
high income economy. If adopted, the author argues, the two main outcomes of the reforms would be, 
first, a reduction in the size and scope of the uncompetitive regulated sub-economy and a 
corresponding, inverse increase in the size and scope of the competitive sub-economy; and second, a 
strengthened competition law and policy regime that can be more effectively enforced throughout the 
national economy without discrimination by ownership or industry. Both these outcomes would help 
China to exploit more fully the country’s latent economic potential, and to achieve high, robust and 
sustainable growth rates based on efficiency, innovation and international competitiveness. They 
would also ensure China’s ‘Market Economy Status’ in global economic relations. 
4.3 Transparency and Adjudication 
A third set of papers explore the question whether the solution to the challenges posed by SOEs is 
better served through increased transparency, or conversely, whether reform can be best achieved 
through adjudication. 
Wolfe (2017) notes that SOEs are a major force in the Chinese economy and a growing presence in 
international trade and investment. Thus, the challenge to the WTO legal regime is both commercial, 
given their size and their share of Chinese output, and political, given worries that trade and 
investment by SOEs may be driven by public policy goals. And both challenges may be exacerbated 
by the murky world of Chinese SOEs. He first addresses the question whether Chinese SOEs are a 
problem for the WTO, and whether more sunshine on their operations might be a useful discipline. He 
then asks what we know about SOEs inside the WTO, including in the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism. Since the answer is, in his view, that these mechanisms offer little guidance or insight, he 
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consider whether mega-regional trade negotiations offer a better approach. His answer being negative, 
he finally considers whether an attempt to negotiate a WTO Reference Paper on SOEs might help. He 
concludes that transparency is likely to be a better discipline on the spillovers associated with SOEs 
than a search for binding rules, while also helping everyone better understand the efficiency effects. 
Trachtman (2017) addresses the broad category of industrial policy conflicts between China and 
the United States, with subsections focusing on discrete issues such as discrimination, subsidies, 
dumping, export restrictions, exchange rate management, and state owned enterprises. He further 
addresses conflicts that have arisen because of concerns relating to security policy, and then examines 
how U.S. and Chinese preferential trade agreement initiatives have sought to gain advantage in these 
areas—a kind of strategic forum shopping—recognizing that the new U.S. administration is unlikely 
to move forward with the Trans-Pacific Partnership. He argues that international law can be used in 
two ways: to promote short-term national advantage in particular disputes, and/or to support rules that 
benefit all, with the expectation that over the long term, this will best promote national advantage. 
China and the U.S., the author claims, can lead the world in formulating and using WTO law. If they 
both engage in long-term support of beneficial trade rules, they will both prosper more in the long run. 
In conclusion, the set of essays comprise a multi-faceted examination of SOEs in the international 
trading system. It is a subject of importance to the further integration of China into the world trading 
system but has broader implications for all jurisdictions where state enterprises continue to be a 
significant area of economic activity. 
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